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I.  Introduction  
Although the capital structure policy is not a new area of research, it remains one of the most 
interesting and puzzling topics of research. The theories and explanations that have emerged 
have  resulted  in  an  enormous  body  of  theoretical  and  empirical  research.  However,  no 
consensus has been reached.  
 
The financial literature in this field was marked by the contributions of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), Miller (1977) and Myers (1984).  The contribution of these authors relates, primarily, 
to the recognition of two theses. The first relates to the absence of impact of the leverage on 
the market value of the firm.  Indeed, the celebrate article of Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
constitutes the starting point of the majority of the studies relating to the leverage.  These two 
pioneers, by adopting a certain number of hypotheses, primarily the existence of perfect and 
frictionless capital markets, prove their irrelevance theorem. According to the irrelevance 
theorem the firm’s financing policy should not affect the firm’s value or its cost of capital. 
The firm’s value is solely determined by its investment decisions. This obviously implies that 
there are no interactions between corporate finance and investment decisions. 
 
This thesis was the subject of several criticisms, which primarily related to the existence of a 
perfect market.  The fact that the researchers neglected the imperfections of the market, in 
particular, the effect of the taxation; costs of bankruptcy; the costs of agency and the costs of 
signaling,  was  regarded  as  a  limitation  with  this  contribution.  By  introducing  market 
imperfections, two research orientations appeared. The first axis, supported by Kraus and 
Litzenberg (1973), Scott (1976), Myers (1977) takes into account the imperfections of the 
market such as the taxation and the costs of bankruptcy and suggests that firms seem to get an 
optimal, value maximizing debt equity ratio by trading off the advantages of debt against the 
disadvantages. 
 
The  second  axis  takes  into  account  the  imperfections  of  the  market  such  as  the  agency 
problems  and  asymmetries  of  information  (Myers,  1984;  Myers  and  Majluf,  1984).  It 
considers the choice of the structure of the capital as a solution to the inefficiencies which 
characterize the decisions of investment of the firm related to the asymmetric information 
between managers and investors. Managers know more about the true value of the firm and 
the  firm’s  riskiness  than  less  informed  outside  investors.  To  avoid  the  underinvestment 
problem,  managers  will  seek  to  finance  the  new  project  using  a  security  that  is  not 
undervalued by the market, such as internal funds or riskless debt. Therefore, this affects the 
choice between internal and external financing. Thus, to mitigate information asymmetry, 
firms follow a financing hierarchy: internal funds are preferred above external financing and 
if the latter becomes necessary, safe debt is preferred over risky debt and equity issues are the 
lowest end choice. 
 
So, research in the capital structure field is dominated by two theories: the static trade off 
theory and pecking order theory. The main purpose of this study is to examine the empirical 
validity of the pecking order and the trade off theory, for a sample of French firms over the 
period 1998 to 2002. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section the theoretical background 
and hypotheses are presented. In section 3 and 4, we test the static trade off theory and the 
pecking order theory against the irrelevance theorem of (Modigliani and Miller (1958)). The 







































adjustment model and a regressing model of the change in total debt level on the internal 
funds deficit. Furthermore, to consider the specificity of the French context (the short term 
debt is not negligible) we have to supplement this approach by introducing short term vision 
in financial deficit. In section 5, to reconcile the STT and the POT, this study tests the pecking 
order model and trade off model in the same regression. Finally, the conclusions are presented 
in section 6. 
 
II.  Theories and related literature:  
  
1.  Static Trade Off:  
 
In  their  second  seminal  paper,  Modigliani  and  Miller  (1963)  have  altered  the  underlying 
argument of their classical proposition of capital structure. They incorporate the corporate 
income tax and contend that the value of the firm, if levered, equals the value of the firm if 
unlevered  plus  the  value  of  the  generated  tax  benefit.  Modigliani  and  Miller  (1963)  as 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) ignore the agency and bankruptcy costs of debt. To certain 
limits, the presence of agency and bankruptcy costs of debt may outweigh its tax benefit, 
suggesting the existence of an optimal target financial debt ratio, under which the firm’s value 
is maximized (Kraus and Litzenberg (1973), Scott (1976), Myers (1977)). The static trade off 
theory (STT) implies that firms have a target debt ratio and try to move towards this target. 
According to Myers (2001), the optimal point can be attained when the marginal value of the 
benefits associated with debt issues exactly offsets the increase in the present value of the 
costs associated with issuing more debt. The benefits include the tax shield whereas the costs 
include expected financial distress costs
1. 
 
The static trade off predicts that:   
 
•  Firms that possess intangible assets or high growth opportunities (high bankruptcy 
costs) tend to be less debt than those with mostly tangible assets (bankruptcy costs 
relatively low). 
•  The risky firms tend to less being involved in debt, anything being equal in addition.   
•  The debt ratio target should be different for different industries that must depend in 
each branch of the evolution of the tax advantage and the danger of bankruptcy. 
•  The mature firms, which usually have many tangible assets, are more indebted than 
firms whose main business growth is largely based on research and development of 
technology and advertising. 
•  The most profitable firms are more indebted.   
•  The  existence  of  a  negative  relationship  between  earnings  variability  and  firm 
leverage. 
 
•  Firms with high marginal rate of imposition (most profitable and whose variation of 
earnings is low) are high debt. 
•  By controlling profitability, the firms with tax benefits unrelated with high debt have 
small debt ratios.   
 
 
                                                           
1 Myers (1984) focuses on the tradeoff between tax benefits and bankruptcy costs when describing the 
static tradeoff theory. Several other papers incorporate more factors into the static tradeoff theory, like 







































2.  The pecking order theory: 
 
The pecking order theory (POT) developed by Myers (1984) is an alternative capital structure 
theory. It predicts that, due to asymmetric information and transactions costs, firms adopt a 
hierarchical order of financing preferences so that internal financing is preferred over external 
financing. If external financing is needed, firms first seek debt funding. Equity is only issued 
as a last resort. This ranking was motivated with reference to the Myers and Majluf (1984) 
adverse  selection  problem  that  arises  because  managers  are  more  knowledgeable  than 
outsiders (investors). Myers and Majluf (1984) claim that if the firm finances its new project 
by issuing new securities, these securities will be under priced. This is because managers 
cannot  credibly  convey  the  quality  of  their  existing  assets  and  available  investment 
opportunities to potential investors. As a result, outsiders may not be able to discriminate 
between good and bad projects, consequently interpreting the firm’s decision to issue new 
securities as a sign of possible bad news and then pricing new securities accordingly. 
 
The Pecking Order Theory stipulates that:   
 
•  Firms prefer internal financing over external financing. However, if in the presence of 
profitable investment opportunities, they choose external financing. 
 
•  They  adapt  their  payout  ratio  of  dividends  to  their  investment  opportunities.  The 
policy is rigid in order to have a sufficient cash flow which enables it to finance its 
investment opportunities. 
 
•  A rigid dividend policy and unpredictable fluctuations in profitability and investment 
opportunities of the firm suggests that internal cash flows may be higher or lower than 
investments. If they are lower, the firm primarily uses its liquidity or its portfolio of 
securities. If they are higher, the firm repays his debt or investing in liquid assets or 
marketable securities. If the surplus continues, it may gradually increase its payout 
ratio target. 
 
•  If external funding is necessary, the firm issues less risky funding, first, the debt, then 
hybrid  securities  such  as  convertible  bonds  and  in  the  last,  it  issues  new  shares. 
Pecking Order theory does not predict a ratio of debt (a mix of debt and equity) well 
defined target because there are two types of capital: internal and external. One is at 
the top of the hierarchy and the other is at the bottom of the hierarchy. The debt ratio 
represents the accumulated firm's external financing needs. 
 
 
3.  Empirical evidence : 
 
Although  many  previous  studies  have  examined  the  pecking  order  theory  and  the  static 
tradeoff theory, there is no consensus on the superiority of one of the theories. 
 
In their recent study, Dufour and Molay (2010) analyzes the capital structure of 1535 French 
SME observed over a period of 8 years. Two representations of financing behavior are tested: 
the first one considers that companies implement a debt policy to reach a target debt ratio 
while the second one relying on a pecking order of financing considers that there is no such a 







































SMEs confirms the greatest explanatory power of the target ratio explanation. The industrial 
sector of the firms does not affect these results. 
 
In similar study, Molay (2005) tests two alternative theories of capital structure: the pecking 
order theory and the static trade off theory. The empirical tests conducted on a sample of 
French firms listed on the Paris stock ex change show that their financing choice seems to be 
more in line with the pecking order theory than with the static trade off theory. The tested 
firms prefer internal financing to external financing and, when using external financing, debt 
is preferred over equity. 
 
In more recent study conducted in the context of Central and Eastern European countries, 
Delcoure (2007) finds a positive relationship between firms leverage ratios on the one hand, 
and asset tangibility, non debt tax shield, and taxes on the other hand. In addition, a negative 
relationship between leverage ratios and profitability is found. Furthermore, puzzling findings 
relating to the relationship between firm size and earnings volatility with the leverage ratios 
are found, as the significant signs change across countries and among the different dependent 
variables. Finally, Delcoure (2007) concludes that the pecking order hypothesis, the trade off 
theory, and the agency theory explain the capital structure puzzle only partially in his sample 
countries.  
 
Syham – Sunder and Myers (1999) test the pecking order theory and trade off theory in the 
US  market.  For  pecking  order  theory,  they  regress  the  firm’s  net  debt  issues  on  its  net 
financing deficit. They find that the estimated coefficient on the deficit variable is close to 
one. Syham – Sunder and Myers (1999) interpret this result as evidence supporting pecking 
order theory because a shortfall in funds is first met by debt. Furthermore, they find that the 
power of trade off theory in explaining new debts issues is better than pecking order theory 
because when the pecking order model and trade off model are nested in the same regression, 
all  cases  of  pecking  order  model  are  rejected  (they  use  the  net  financing  deficit  as  an 
additional explanatory variable in their trade off theory model).  
 
III.  Static Trade Off Theory: Empirical Evidence 
To  test  the  static  trade off  theory  (STT)  against  the  irrelevance  theorem  (Modigliani  and 
Miller (1958)), we rely firstly on the approach initiated by Shyam Sunder and Myers (1999), 
and secondly by adding a few tests to account for possible effects (sector, size, risk and 
capital intensity) on the behavior debt of the French firm. 
The description of data, the presentation of the variables studied and the hypotheses tested are 
successively  assessed  in  this  section  concludes  with  a  presentation  and  interpretation  of 
results.  
1.  Data and methodology:   
Our  sample  consists  of  122  French  firms  belonging  to  different  sector  (Agroalimentary, 
chemicals,  pharmaceuticals  and  cosmetics,  basic  industry,  general  industry  and  service). 
Given the differences in approach to funding policy between financial firms and non financial 
ones,  it  seemed  appropriate  to  eliminate  the  financial  firm.  The  choice  of  sectors  and 







































The data used in the study are mainly accounting data on balance sheets, income statements 
and cash flow. They are provided by the financial markets authority (AMF). The study period 
extends from 1998 to 2002 i.e. 610 observations.  
To test the static trade off theory for the selected sample of French firms, models (M1) (M2) 
(M3) (M4) are then estimated on data consisting of 121 firms multiply by 5 observations. To 
this end, we first calculated the change in long term debt for each firm and each year. Next, 
we determined the variation in the ratio of long term debt. Finally, the long term debt target 
was calculated in two ways: with the approach set by Shyam Sunder and Myers (1999) and on 
the basis of a debt target sector average.  
1.1.1.  Dependent Variables:  
The explanatory variables are classified into two groups depending on whether one wants to 
test the model (M1) or model (M2). Indeed the model (M1) uses the change in the amount of 
long term debt us variable while the model (M2) refers to the change of the ratio of long term 
debt. 
The variation of the long term debt is determined as follows: 
                                        ∆Dit  =  Dit     Dit 1   
Where Dit:  the long term debt of the i




For each firm considered, it has 5 annual observations. In total and for the 122 firms in the 
sample  used,  we  have  610  observations  of  the  change  of  the  long term  debt.  
 
The variation in the ratio of long term debt is calculated as follows: 















Dit : the long term debt of  i
th firm at time t 
Ait: the book value of assets of i
th firm at time t. It is equal to the difference between total 
assets and net current liabilities (Shyam Sunder and Myers (1999)). 
 
1.1.2.  Independent variable:   
  
For  describing  the  explanatory  variable  of  the  models  (M1)  and  (M2),  it  is  necessary  to 
determine as a preliminary the long term debt targets such as definite by Shyam Sunder and 
Myers (D*it : the target ratio of the i
th firm) and such as we defined it as a sectoral average 




















































1998 *  
Where: 
 
T:  the period of the study.  It corresponds to five years (T=5).   
 
CAPIit: the book value of the credit of i
th firm at the period T  
 
Thereafter, we calculated the explanatory variables zit  and z’it (wit  and wjt ) : the distance 
between the target value and the delayed value (the target ratio and the ratio delayed) for one 
year of the long term debt ; determined by the following expression:   
 









d w                (global) 










d w               (sectoral)           
  Where:  
          d*it  : the debt ratio targets of  i
th firm     
       d*jt : the debt ratio targets of  j
th  sector  
 
1.1.3.  Regression Model and hypotheses:  
 
The static trade off theory rests on the assumption according to which the managers are in 
search of an optimal structure of the capital.  Random events can move away them from this 
objective. Nevertheless, the managers must converge there gradually.  If the optimal debt ratio 
is  stable,  it  is  then  possible  to  note  a  behavior  of  return  to  the  average  (Mean  reverting 
behavior).  A simple form of the model of adjustment explains the variations of the debt ratio 
by the deviations of the current ratio from the target ratio.   
 
The first stage of our research consists in checking this result.  For that, we carried out the 
following regressions:   
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For each firm and each year, variables ∆Dit (D*it   Dit 1) and (D*jt   Dit 1) were reported at book 
value of assets of each firm only as a precaution against heteroscedasticity (Shyam Sunder and 
Myers (1999)).  Furthermore, our analysis is limited to the carrying value of debt and the debt ratio 
is expressed only at book value. 
In order to highlight the possible effects of size
2, risk
3 and capital intensity
4 on the long term 
debt from the French firms in the sample, we adopted an approach which is to classify firms 
into two categories around the median of each variable: SMEs and large firms, less risky and 
risky, capital intensive and low capital intensive and then estimate the Model (M1) (M2) 
(M3) (M4). 
 
The  model  estimation  model  estimation  is  performed  through  the  software  "SPSS". 
 
 
2.  Regression results 
  
The first step of our research is to estimate the models (M1) and (M2). Estimation of the 
model (M1) shows the following results ( Table 1). 
 
                           ( ) 1
* 414 . 0 301729 − − − =   it it it D D D                                  (M1)
5 
                               (3.591)*    ( 12.162)**
6               
 
Analysis of the results of the estimation of model (M1) shows that the coefficient associated 
with the variable (D*it – Dit 1) is not affected by the expected sign ( 0.414 < 0). Nevertheless, 
it verifies the assumption that its value is less than the unit ( 0.414 < 1). In addition, to the 5% 
level, the variable (D*it –Dit 1) is contributory to the explanation of debt financing in the long 
term. 
 
At 5% level, the intercept is significant. The coefficient of determination of the model (M1) is 
0.27. Moreover, the results of the estimation of model (M2) that the variable is measured by 
the variation long term debt are as follows: 
 
                                                           
2 The approximate variable used is the average of the capital engaged for each firm  
3 The approximate variable used is the standard deviation of the capacity of self financing divided by the average 
of this last.   
4  The approximate variable used is the average of ratio investment by capital engaged for each firm 
 
5 Values in parentheses indicate the statistical "t" of student 
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* 853 . 0 028 . 0 − − + =   it it it d d d
              (M2) 
                                       (1.429)      (14.930)** 
 
The  estimation  of  model  (M2)  shows  a  finding  that  the  use  of  debt  as  measured  by  the 
variation of long term debt is significantly related to the distance between the target ratio and 
the ratio of delayed debt long term. This result is consistent with expectations of the STT. 
 
In addition, the intercept is not significant. The coefficient of determination of the model 
(M2) is 0.359. The estimation results of models (M1) and (M2) are reported in Table (1). 
 
Regression results of model (M1) of the aggregate basis show that at the 5% level, the long 
term debt of firms in the sample moves away significantly from the target level of the long 
term  debt  (bTA  =   0.414  <  1  and  Student  t   12.162).  Contrary  to  the  predictions  of  the 
adjustment model of capital structure, the coefficient associated with the variable (D * it   Dit 
1) is negative and significant at 5% level. 
This finding invalidates the hypothesis that change in long term debt partially absorbs the 
difference  between  the  target  and  the  lagged  value  of  long term  debt.  
 
Moreover, the speed of adjustment towards the target value of long term debt is low. Indeed, 
an adjustment factor of  41.4% reflects the relatively rapid adjustments in respect of long term 
debt. In addition, the coefficient on the variable zit is significantly less than unity, suggesting 
the existence of positives adjustment costs. 
The  estimation  of  model  (M2)  shows  results  consistent  with  expectations.  Indeed,  the 
coefficient on the distance between the target ratio and the ratio of delayed long term debt is 
positive and significant at 5% (bTA = 0.853 and t statistic = 14,930). An adjustment factor of 
85.3% reflects a relatively high speed of adjustment and shows that the variation in the ratio 
of  long term  debt  absorbs  quickly  the  distance  between  the  target  ratio  and  the  ratio  of 
delayed long term debt. 
 
2.1.Regression results of firms according to the restraint characteristic: 
 
The estimation results of models (M1) and (M2) are presented in Table 2. 
 
The estimation of the model (M2) for small firms show that at the 5% level, small firms 
converge significantly and partially to the target level of long term debt (bTA = 0.760 and 
Student’s  t=7.442).  In  addition,  the  adjustment  factor  is  less  than  unity  suggesting  the 
existence  of  positive  adjustment  costs  associated  with  market  imperfections.  A  speed 
adjustment of 76% shows that the change in long term debt absorbs quickly the distance 
between the target and the lagged value of long term debt for small firms. Estimation of the 








































The results of the estimation of model (M2) for large firms shows that the ratio of long term 
debt of large firms in the sample converges quickly and significantly to the target ratio (bTA 
=0.939 and student’s t = 16.654). 
Estimation of the model (M1) for the least risky companies shows that at the 5% level, the 
long term debt of firms in the sample moves away significantly from the target level of long 
term debt. This finding invalidates the hypothesis that the change in long term debt partially 
absorbs the difference between the target and the lagged value of long term debt. Moreover, 
regression  results  of  the  model  (M2)  show  that  the  ratio  of  long term  debt  converges 
significantly and quickly to the target ratio (bTA =0.987 and Student’s t =15.758).  
The results of the estimation of model (M1) for risky firms show that at the 5% level, the 
long term debt of French firms is significantly closer to the target (bTA = 0.690 and Student’s t 
=11.986). This result confirms the hypothesis that change in long term debt partially absorbs 
the difference between the target and the lagged value of long term debt. The estimation of 
model  (M2)  shows  results  very  close  to  those  observed  in  the  analysis  model  (M1). 
 
Estimation  of  the  model  (M1)  for  lowly  capital  intensity  firms  highlight  a  negative  and 
significant adjustment factor at the 5% level (bTA = 0.644 and Student’s t = 19.292).  Thus, 
the debt ratio moves away partially from the target value. 
The  results  of  the  estimation  of  the  model  (M2)  for  highly  capital  intensive  firms  are 
consistent  with  predictions  of  the  model  of  capital  structure  adjustment.  Indeed,  the 
adjustment coefficient is positive and significant (bTA = 0.931 and Student’s t =10.029). In 
addition,  the  adjustment  factor  is  less  than  unity,  suggesting  the  existence  of  positive 
adjustment costs. Estimation of the model (M1) shows the results very close to those observed 
during the analysis of the model (M2). 
In sum, the test of the STT against the irrelevance theorem for our sample of French firms 
shows that:  
￿  Firms tend to converge to an optimal overall capital. 
 
￿  The existence of a sectoral effect is validated. By choosing an optimal structure by 
sector, the change in long term debt absorbs, with a specific speed to each sector, the 
difference between the target and the lagged value of long term debt. 
 
￿  The existence of positive adjustment costs that the French firms of the sample does not 
completely and probably converge at any time to the target level of long term debt. 
Nevertheless, the costs of deviations from an optimal structure are generally not high 
enough to prevent French firms from the sample used to make more use of long term 
debt. 
 
￿  The existence of a size effect. Indeed, large firms in our sample seem to converge 
more quickly towards the target level of long term debt. 
 
 
￿  The existence of risk effect: the less risky firms those who’s their cash flow is more 








































￿  The most capital intensive firms seem to converge more quickly towards the target 
level of long term debt. 
 
 
IV.  Pecking Order Theory : Empirical Evidence 
This part aims to test the Pecking Order Theory which can explain the financial behavior of 
French firms in the sample against the irrelevance theorem (Modigliani and Miller (1958 )). 
Firstly,  we  selected  the  approach  initiated  by  Shyam Sunder  and  Myers  (1999)  and  also 
extend this approach to be compatible with the French view (the short term debt does is not 
negligible). The description of data, presentation of the variables studied and the identification 
of hypotheses tested are successively presented in this part which ends with a presentation and 
interpretation of results. 
1.  Data and methodology : 
To test the POT we used the same sample, the same study period and the same data sources 
used in the empirical study conducted in the second section. Thus, the study was conducted on 
122 French firms from different sectors over the period from 1998 to 2002. 
An examination of the POT for the sample of French firms selected requires measuring the 
funds flow deficit in each period and for each firm. Data are collected from balance sheets and 
financial statements. To this end, we determined the variables needed to calculate the funds 
flow deficit of firms. Moreover, the explanatory variables as defined by Shyam Sunder and 
Myers (1999) were calculated. 
1.1.Dependent variables:  
It should be remembered that our study is based on the same explanatory variables used in the 
empirical analysis in second section of the present work.  
The variation of the long term debt is determined as follows: 
                         ∆Dit  =  Dit      Dit 1   
Where:  Dit:  the  long term  debt  of    i
th  firm  at  time  t  as  it  appear  in  his  balance  sheet 
                
For each firm considered, it has 5 annual observations. In total and for the 122 firms in the 
sample  used,  we  have  610  observations  of  the  variation  of  the  long term  debt. 
 
The  variation  in  the  ratio  of  long term  debt  is  calculated  as  follows: 
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Where: 
Dit : the long term debt of  i







































Ait  :  the net book of assets of  i
th firm at time t. It is equal to the difference between total 
assets and net current liabilities (Shyam Sunder and Myers, (1999)). 
1.2.Independent variable: 
For purposes of this study, we consider that a firm faces in each period to fund requirements. 
The funds flow deficit of the firm in year t are given by: 
            DEFt = DIVt + Xt + ∆Wt   + Rt     Ct      








            DEF’t =  DIVt + Xt +  ∆Wt + ∆Cht + ∆DCTt +  Rt     Ct       








' =                                                                        
Where: 
               Ct = operating cash flows after interest and taxes. 
 
            Divt=dividend payments. 
 
            Xt = capital expenditure. 
 
            ∆Wt = net increase in working capital. 
            Rt = current portion of long term debt at start of period. 
 
            CHt = liquidity and short term investments. 
 
            DCTt = the short term debt. 
 
            Dt = the long term debt. 
 
            At = net book assets
7  
            dt =   Dt / At : the book debt ratio. 
1.3.The estimation technique and testable hypotheses: 
In its simplest form, the POT states that when internal cash flows of the firm do not adjust its 
investment opportunities and real commitments on distribution of dividends, it emits then the 
debt without risk. She never proceeds with the issuance of new shares except where it can 
only issue junk bonds and when the bankruptcy costs are high. Based in part on the approach 
Shyam   Sunder and Myers (1999), the funds flow deficit of the firms are assumed to be met 
by the change of the ratio of long term debt and the change in long term debt, and secondly 
                                                           







































we have reformulated the funds flow deficit so that it can account for the short term vision. 
The purpose of this study is to verify this result. For this model (M5) (M6) (M7) and (M8) are 
then estimated. 
it it PO it e DEF b a D + + =                                         (M5) 
it it PO it e def b a d + + =                                    (M6) 
it it PO it e DEF b a DTOT + + =  
'                               (M7) 
                                  it it PO it e def b a dTOT + + =  
'                                  (M8) 
Where: 
     Dit : the long term debt issued  by i
th firm (or repaid if surplus).           
    DEFi: the financial deficit of the i
th firm.  
    defit:  the  financial  deficit  of    i
th  firm  divided  by  its  total  equity. 
 
    ∆dit : the change in the ratio of long term debt. 
     DTOTit : net total debt issued (or repaid if surplus) by the firm i. 
    DEF'i: fixed needs of i
th firm. 
    ∆dTOTit : the change in the ratio of total net debt. 
    def’it :  the  corrected  financial  funds  flow  deficit  of  the  i
th  firm  divided  by  equity. 
  
The test of significance of the coefficient bPO is written as follows
8: 
















In  order  to  test  the  POT,  the  two  hypotheses  that  a  =  0  and  bpo  =  1  are  verified. 
The model estimation is tested by software "SPSS". 
2.   Rgression results: 
Analysis of the results of estimating models (M5) shows that the coefficient (bPO) is different 
from unity and statistically significant at 5% level. This result suggests that at the 5% level the 
variable  DEF  has  a  significant  contribution  to  explaining  the  change  of  long term  debt. 
Moreover, with a correlation coefficient which equals zero results of the estimation of model 
(M6) are not taken into account. 
The results of the estimation model (M7) did not differ from those obtained when estimating 
the model (M5). Indeed, the coefficient associated with the variable deficit is different from 
unity and statistically significant at 5% level. Thus, the indicator of deficit plays a role in 
explaining the variation in total net debt. In addition, the intercept is different of zero and 
                                                           







































statistically. In contrast, when the observed variable is the debt ratio and not the change of 
debt, the results do not support the POT. 
 
2.1.Regression results by sector: 
 
The results of estimating models (M5) (M6) (M7) and (M8) are presented in Table (4). 
 
The results of the estimation of the model (M5) show that at 5% level the variable deficit is 
significantly  contributory  to  explaining  the  variation  in  long term  debt  for  the  Agro 
alimentary sector. The results of the estimation of model (M6) did not differ from those 
obtained when estimating the model (M5). 
 
For the chemicals sector, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics, the indicator deficit plays a role in 
explaining the variation in long term debt (total debt net) in the model (M5), (M6) , (M7) and 
(8). 
 
The regression results of models (M7) and (M8) for basic industry sector and general industry 
sector are consistent with predictions of the POT.  Indeed, the deficit variable contributes 
significantly  to  explaining  the  change  in  net  total  debt  and  net  total  debt  ratio. 
 
For the service sector, the regression results of the model (M5) show that the indicator of the 
deficit plays a role in explaining change in long term debt. 
 
2.2.Regression results according to the feature selected: 
 
The  results  of  the  regression  models  (M5)  and  (M6)  show  that  the  DEF  variable  is 
explanatory of the change of the long term debt (rate of long term debt) for the large firms, 
the least risky firms and the low capital intensive firms.  In addition, regression results of the 
models (M7) and (M8) are not different from those obtained during the estimate of the models 
(M5) and (M6).   
 
Ultimately, the test of the theory POT against the irrelevance theorem for the sample of the 
French firms retained leads to the following results:  
 
￿  The financial deficit contributes only partially to the explanation of the change of the 
long term debt for our total sample.  Consequently, the hypothesis of POT can be 
accepted.   
 
￿  The existence of a sectoral effect for the short term vision.  Indeed, the change of the 
long term debt is explained significantly by the deficit for the sectors agro alimentary, 
chemistry, pharmacy, cosmetic and service whereas the change of the clear total debt 
is explained significantly by the deficit corrected for the basic industry and general 
industry sectors.   
 
￿  The  existence  of  a  size,  risk  and  capital  intensive  intensity  effects.    Indeed,  the 
indicator of financial deficit plays a significant role in the explanation of the variation 
of the long term debt for the large firms, the least risky firms and the low capital 








































￿  With the obviousness, our empirical results do not make it possible to conclude on a 
better explanation of the behaviors by a model or the other.  From where the idea, 
already suggested by Syham Sunder and Myers (1999) to combine the two approaches 
to try to explain the variety of the behaviors.   
 
V.  Combining Trade off and Pecking order models: 
Previous studies have shown that understanding the behavior of firms in terms of choice of 
financing passes certainly through conciliation and not confrontation of the two analytical 
frameworks best known. 
This paragraph proposes to analyze models combining each of the factors that might explain 
the financial behavior of French firms in the sample by the static trade off theory or the 
pecking order theory. We would then know whether the explanatory power and significance 
of  the  coefficients  of  the  models  (M1),  (M2),  (M3),  (M4),  (M5)  and  (M6)  will  they  be 
improved taking into account both specific factors to the STT and to POT. 
1.  Regression Model: 
 
In order to verify the improvement in explanatory power and significance of the coefficients 
of the models (M1), (M2), (M3), (M4), (M5) and (M6), we tested the following regressions. 
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2.  Regression results of the Model combining partial adjustment and the hierarchy 
of financing models: 
 
The  results  of  the  models  estimation  (M9)  and  (M10)  show  that  their  coefficients  of 
determination have increased considerably, which means that the addition of the indicator of 
the  distance  between  the  target  and  the  lagged  value  of  long  term  debt  improves  the 
explanatory power of models (M5) and (M6). 
 
The combination of the two models of capital structure has improved the significance of the 
coefficient associated with the variable DEF. 
 
2.1.Regression results by sector: 
 
The estimate of the models (M11) and (M12) led to results similar to those obtained during 







































Ultimately, the combination of the partial adjustment model and the hierarchy of financing 
model improve considerably the statistical capacity of the hierarchical model and confirm the 
assumptions of the POT in the majority of the sectors selected.  
How to explain that the combination of two approaches predicting the different behaviors, to 
see contradictory, makes it possible better to account for the reality of the practices that each 
model separately?  
 
One can imagine two explanations:   
 
•  The managers have a target ratio but they show opportunism, in the way which they 
take to reach it.  Nevertheless, this way is directed by the hierarchical financing.   
 
•  There are two non reconcilable types of behavior, but which cohabit in our sample, 
and probably in the population.  The taking into account of two models makes it 
possible to increase the variance explained without justifying of a real combination of 
the practices in the same firm.   
 
VI.  Discussion and conclusion:  
 
This paper presents the empirical tests on data from a sample of French firms and which are 
intended to explain their behavior in terms of financing. 
 
In the second section, we empirically tested the static trade off theory against the irrelevance 
theorem for a sample of 121 French firms from different sectors over a period from 1998 
2002. To do this we adopted the approach of Shyam Sunder and Myers (1999). Our studies 
highlight the following results: 
  
 
￿  A convergence to an global optimal structure of capital from firms in the sample. 
 
￿  The existence of a sectoral effect is validated. By choosing an optimal structure sector, 
the  change  in  long term  debt  absorbs  with  a  speed  specific  to  each  sector,  the 
difference between the target and the lagged value of long term debt. 
 
￿  The existence of positive adjustment costs that make firms in the sample probably did 
not  converge  completely  at  any  time  to  the  target  level  of  long term  debt. 
Nevertheless, the costs of deviations from an optimal structure are generally not high 
enough to prevent French firms from the sample used to make more use of long term 
debt. 
 
￿  The existence of size effect. Indeed, large firms in sample chosen seem to converge 
more quickly towards the target level of long term debt (which is consistent with the 
assumptions of STT). 
 
￿  The  existence  of  risk  effect:  the  less  risky  firms  seem  to  converge  more  quickly 
towards the target level of long term debt. 
 
￿  The most capital intensive firms seem to converge more quickly towards the target 








































The  third  section  presents  an  empirical  study  of  the  behavior  dictated  by  the  POT.  We 
empirically tested the relationship between the change in long term debt and financial deficit, 
firstly, as defined by Shyam Sunder and Myers (1999) and then by introducing the specific 
French context which do not neglect the short term debts, a new financial deficit is calculated. 
 
Empirical tests of the theory of the POT against the irrelevance theorem show that:                        
 
￿  The financial deficit contributes only partially to the explanation of the change in 
long term debt for the full sample of French firms. Therefore, the hypotheses of the 
POT are accepted. 
 
￿  The existence of a sectoral effect for short term vision. Indeed, the change in long 
term debt is significantly explained by the deficit for the agro alimentary, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and service sectors while the change in total net debt is 
significantly explained by the deficit adjusted for industry sectors basic and general 
industry. 
 
￿  The  existence  of  a  size,  risk  and  capital  intensity  effect.  Indeed,  the  indicator  of 
financial deficit plays a significant role in explaining the variation in long term debt 
for large firms, less risky and low capital intensive firms. 
 
This paper concludes with an empirical study combining the model of the Trade Off and the 
hierarchy  of  financing.  The  inclusion  of  two  schemes  of  analysis  greatly  improves  the 
statistical power of the hierarchical model and confirms the hypotheses of the POT in the 
majority of the selected sectors. 
 
In sum, this study shows that we can not formally reject either of the two theories explaining 
financing choices. However, it confirms the importance of considerations provided by the 
static trade off theory. 
 
However, if this study helps to better understand financial behavior of French firms in the 
sample, it does not include less serious restrictions. Indeed: 
 
The  partial  adjustment  model  that  we  applied  to  determine  the  convergence  behavior  of 
French  firms  in  the  sample  supposes  the  stability  of  the  target  level  of  long term  debt. 
However,  the  determinants  of  debt  such  as  the  variability  of  profits,  tangibility,  growth 
opportunities, size, profitability, tax savings which are not linked to debt ... are likely to vary 
over time for same firm. This captures the dynamic nature of capital structure. We should 
therefore use a debt target which changes in the time. 
 
Moreover, the adjustment factor used in the adjustment model is assumed constant over time 
and identical for all firms. Nevertheless, the speed of adjustment towards optimal capital 
structure depends on several factors specific to the firm such that the distance between the 
target  and  the  lagged  value  of  long term  debt,  the  firm  size,  growth  opportunities, 
profitability, general economic conditions, etc. Thus, the adjustment is done at a rate specific 
to each firm (Heshmati (2001)). 
 
In addition, the hierarchical model we used does not necessarily evaluate the pecking order 







































Sunder and Myers (1999) is likely to be rejected even when the firms' behavior is consistent 
with the assumptions of the POT. The hierarchical model can be also used even when the 
financial behavior firms is inconsistent with the POT.  
However, the results demonstrated for the sample of French firms open several avenues for 
future research. Indeed, alternative tests are necessary to enable beneficiaries to identify the 
determinants of capital structure and  also enable to distinguish between rival hypotheses. 
 
Finally, a better understanding of the relationship between the financing of the firm measured 
by stock (the levels of debt and equity in relation to the target level) and the financing of the 
firm  measured  in  flow  (which  title  to  be  emitted  at  a  given  moment)  can  reconcile  the 
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Table 1: Regression results of model estimates (M1) and (M2) 
 














2  0.270  0.359 
 umber of observation  605  605 
 
Table  2:  Regression  results  of  models  (M1)  and  (M2)  for  French  firms  in  the  sample 
according to each characteristic restraint: 
 
 














2  0.358  0.226 
Large Firms 














2  0.276  0.576 
Less risky firms 














2  0.359  0.558 
Risky firms 




















































2  0.418  0.328 
Low capital 
intensive firm 












2  0.662  0.443 
High capital 
intensive firm 














2  0.287  0.328 
 
           
  Table 3: Regression results of model (M5) (M6), (M7) and (M8) 
 






















2  0.482  0.000  0.039  0.001 
 























































Independent variable  (6.805)**  (1.70)  (2.324)  ( 5.621)* 
R
2  0.556  0.072  0.127  0.461 
Chemical and pharmaceutical sector 




















2  0.675  0.207  0.390  0.074 
Basic Industrial sector 






















2  0.062  0.02  0.216  0.002 
General industrial sector 






















2  0.025  0.104  0.147  0.377 
Service sector 


























Table  5:  Regression  results  of  the  models  (M5)  (M6)  (M7)  and  (M8)  for  French  firms 

































































2  0.556  0.072  0.127  0.461 
Chemical and pharmaceutical sector 




















2  0.675  0.207  0.390  0.074 
Basic Industrial sector 






















2  0.062  0.02  0.216  0.002 
General industrial sector 






















2  0.025  0.104  0.147  0.377 
Service sector 




























































Table 6: Regression results of the models (M9) (M10) 
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2  0.567  0.364 
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2  0.681  0.171 
Chemical and pharmaceutical sector 
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2  0.104  0.113 
General industrial sector 
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2  0.086  0.252 
Service sector 
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2  0.591  0.298 
h
a
l
-
0
0
6
0
3
7
6
2
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
2
7
 
J
u
n
 
2
0
1
1